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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS C. PAPPALARDO ) 
AND HELENA C. PAPPALARDO ) 
V. 
PHILIP C. 
AND 
HARRY D. 
Plaintiffs and ) 
Appellants, ) 
PUGSLEY ) 
Defendant ) 
PUGSLEY ) 
Defendant and ) 
Respondent ) 
Case No. 14685 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a legal malpractice action brought by plaintiffs-
appellants alleging that defendants were negligent in their 
representation of plaintiffs1 interests in real property. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried before a jury with the Honorable 
Gordon R. Hall presiding. At the conclusion of plaintiffs1 
case defendants moved for a dismissal as to both defendants. 
The court granted the motion as to defendant Philip Pugsley 
but allowed the plaintiffs to reopen their case as to defen-
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i 
dant Harry Pugsley. Thereafter, plaintiffs called defendant 
Harry Pugsley as an adverse witness and again rested. 
Defendants renewed their motions and the trial court 
granted a motion for directed verdict pursuant to Rule 50 
U.R.C.P. on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient 
as a matter of law to sustain a finding that the defendants 
were negligent in violating the accepted legal standards of 
practice in Salt Lake City and the State of Utah and was also 
insufficient as a matter of law to warrant a finding that the 
plaintiffs had been damaged as a result of any alleged negli-
gence of defendants. 
This appeal is taken solely from the verdict directed 
towards defendant Harry Pugsley. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-respondent seeks an affirmance of the lower 
court decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because this Court must carefully review all of the evi-
dence presented at trial to determine the propriety of the 
directed verdict, the following detailed synopsis of the 
pleadings and trial testimony is offered: 
This action was commenced on January 2, 1975 by plain-
tiffs alleging that defendants were negligent in their legal 
representation of plaintiffs' interest in certain property 
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located in Salt Lake County. (R., pp. 15-19). More specifi-
cally, plaintiffs claimed that defendants were negligent in 
advising plaintiffs not to borrow money to pay off delin-
quent installments concerning the property, were negligent 
in referring some of the defenses to an attorney represent-
ing the equity owners, and in failing to file answers to the 
complaints. Plaintiffs sought damages for the sum of $30,000 
and approximately $1,400 per month for loss of rental income. 
(R., pp. 17-18). 
Defendants in their answer asserted that they had ad-
vised plaintiffs to pay the delinquent obligations but that 
plaintiffs responded they had no funds to do so and requested 
that the defenses be referred to a lawyer representing the 
equitable owner co-defendant. Defendants asserted that the 
matters were referred to duly licensed lawyers who agreed to 
defend and did in fact defend several proceedings instituted 
against plaintiffs and that defendants themselves filed plead-
ings in two cases. As affirmative defenses, defendants al-
leged that plaintiffs were estopped from claiming damages 
because of their own inability to pay the obligation in spite 
of numerous opportunities, that plaintiffs were guilty of 
contributory negligence which was the primary cause of any 
alleged loss, and that plaintiffs could claim no defense to 
the delinquent contract actions. (R., pp. 24-26). 
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On June 7, 1976 a jury trial was held before the Honor-
able Gordon R. Hall. Initially, plaintiffs called only two 
witnesses: Thomas C. Pappalardo (.hereinafter Pappalardo) and 
Paul Sharrot (hereinafter Sharrot). After being allowed to 
reopen their case plaintiffs also called defendant Harry Pugs-
ley, 
On direct examination, Pappalardo testified that in 1970 
he owned six properties in Salt Lake City amounting to a to-
tal investment of $30,000. (Tr., pp. 59-60). In January of 
1970 while at the real estate office of his son-in-law Sharrot, 
Pappalardo met a Mr. Janis who was interested in forming a 
property management corporation named Pacific States Invest-
ment Corporation. Shortly thereafter, Pappalardo conveyed 
his equity to the company in exchange for an unsecured promis-
sory note in the amount of $30,000. Pappalardo also gave the 
company a promissory note for $4,900. Under the terms of the 
agreement he was to receive $7 00 a month from Pacific States 
Investments Incorporated (hereinafter Pacific). (Tr., p. 61). 
After receiving only one good check from Pacific, Pappa-
lardo and Sharrot visited the law office of Harry Pugsley. 
(Tr., pp. 61-62). At this meeting Harry Pugsley told Pappalardo 
that the note he had received from Pacific was unsecured and, 
according to Pappalardo, told him, "I'll do the best I can to 
secure a promissory note and get a deed of trust for you and 
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in your behalf so that we can protect your equities". (Tr., 
p. 62). Shortly thereafter, Pappalardo borrowed $1,000 and 
gave it to Harry Pugsley for his retainer fee. At that time 
a suit was commenced against Pacific and various individuals 
including Sharrot who was then president of Pacific. (Tr., 
p. 63? Exhibit 1). The lawsuit filed by Harry Pugsley on be-
half of Pappalardo resulted in a stipulation dated December 
30, 1971 in which Pacific agreed to make any delinquent pay-, 
ments and to provide Pappalardo with monthly reports. (Exhi-
bit 1) . 
On further direct examination, Pappalardo stated that 
several months before the stipulation was signed, Pappalardo 
received his first summons from a disgruntled legal title 
owner of one of the properties Pappalardo had purchased and 
later sold to Pacific. (Tr., p. 65). He stated that he made 
six separate trips to Harry Pugsley each time with a summons 
or a notice of default. (Tr., p. 63-69). Pappalardo testi-
fied that upon each occasion Harry Pugsley informed him that 
he did not need to worry about the notices and summons, that 
he would insure that Pappalardo had sufficient time to borrow 
money if necessary, and that he was going to contact Bill 
Cayias, Pacificfs attorney, and make the corporation pay its 
obligations. (Tr., pp. 65-71). Pappalardo testified that he 
could have borrowed money for the delinquencies and further 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
testified that he repeatedly told Harry Pugsley of this fact. 
(Tr., pp. 66, 68, 69). « 
Pappalardo testified that in 1972 he appeared before 
Judge Croft at which time he was represented by Phil Pugsley, 
• < 
Harry Pugsley's son. At that time two of his properties were 
restored to him. Pappalardo stated that he asked Phil Pugsley 
what had happened to the remaining properties and was told 
at that time that they were "lost". (Tr., p. 71). Pappa-
lardo attempted to testify as to the rental value of the pro-
perty but the trial court precluded such testimony since the 
agreement with Pacific precluded him from receiving rent. 
(Tr., pp. 72-75) . 
On cross-examination, Pappalardo admitted that in his 
original transaction with Pacific he did not require Janis to 
sign the note individually because his son-in-law Sharrot was 
to become president of the corporation and he was told that 
this would be sufficient security to protect his interests. 
(Tr., p. 79). Pappalardo stated that he did not know at the 
time of this transaction that he was conveying all of his equity 
interest to Pacific and further that he could not understand 
why he was required to give Pacific a $4,900 note but that his 
son-in-law Sharrot said that it was required and he therefore 
acquiesced. (Tr., pp. 80-81). 
Pappalardo testified that he began receiving the delin-
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guent notices even before he contacted Harry Pugsley and 
that he was afraid then that he was going to lose his interest 
in these properties. (Tr., p. 82). Pappalardo verified that 
in October of 1971 a suit was filed against Pacific and that 
two months later a stipulation was agreed upon by all of the 
parties. (Tr., p. 83). The December 31, 1971 stipulation, 
introduced in evidence as Exhibit 1, provided for the follow-
ing: 
1. The corporation would execute a note in the 
amount of $30,000 in favor of plaintiffs to 
be paid in monthly installments of $600 at 
8 per cent interest. 
2. The corporation, in order to give Pappalardo 
proper security, would convey to him a Deed 
of Trust as to each property. 
3. The corporation was to cancel Pappalardo's 
original note to it of $4,900. 
4. MThe parties recognize and agree that because 
of the dispute arising between them, the con-
tract payments on a number of the properties 
are delinquent and that it will take at least 
six months for Pacific States Investments, 
Incorporated, and its principals to place the 
contracts covering the said properties in good 
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standing and current, and the parties agree 
that such corporation shall start making pay-
ments of the said contract at once, shall 
provide monthly reports reflecting such pay-
ments, and shall have a total of six months 
to place the properties and the contract 
thereon in good standing as far as payments 
are concerned. If said corporations fail to 
do so, plaintiffs may exercise their rights 
under the deed of trust." (Exhibit 1, Tr., 
pp. 83-86) . 
On further cross-examination, Pappalardo stated that one 
suit had been filed previous to the stipulation agreement and 
that the other five were filed in a period of time from January 
to April of 1972. (Tr., p. 87; note: line 2 should read 1972). 
Pappalardo could not recall whether Harry Pugsley had told him 
that his only defense was to raise the money. (Tr., p. 88). 
Pappalardo stated that he was willing to borrow on the property 
but that he had been told that his equity wasn't sufficient and 
that his son-in-law said he would combine his property so that 
a loan could be obtained. (Tr., p. 89). 
Pappalardo did not testify as to any specific amount he 
could have borrowed or as to where the money would have been 
obtained. Pappalardo admitted that he did not know the exact 
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amount owing on the back payments, did not know if attorney's 
fees were being asked, and did not know whether the property 
owners were seeking the entire unpaid balance as their claims. 
(Tr., p. 90). 
When asked if he knew how much the suits were asking 
for he replied, "Well, at the present time, Sir, I canft tell 
you truthfully, I can't." (Tr., p. 90). Pappalardo stated 
that he assumed that once the back payments were made the con-
tracts would have been reinstated regardless of the delinquency. 
(Tr., p. 91). 
Finally, Pappalardo admitted that he was in destitute 
financial circumstances during this time and that Harry Pugs-
ley helped him to receive welfare assistance from the state. 
(Tr., p. 92). 
On re-direct examination Pappalardo testified that he did 
not know what became of the lawsuits filed against him after he 
handed the summonses to Harry Pugsley. He further stated that 
he no longer had the property referred to in the lawsuits. 
(Tr., p. 93). 
Plaintiffs called Paul Sharrot as their second witness. 
Sharrot testified that he was the son-in-law of Pappalardo and 
that he accompanied Pappalardo to Harry Pugsley's office at 
the time of the first meeting. (Tr., pp. 95-96). Sharrot 
testified that Harry Pugsley told them that he would commence 
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suit against Mr. Janis and Pacific and that in fact a suit was 
commenced. (Tr., p. 97). 
Sharrot testified that Harry Pugsley had informed them 
that it was Cayias1 client's obligation to make the delinquent 
payments and that he would contact him about it. (Tr. , p. 100). 
Sharrot stated that he suggested money be borrowed and held in 
escrow to satisfy the various land owners but that Harry Pugs-
ley advised them against it saying that there was no need to 
borrow the money or pay interest. (Tr., p. 101). Finally, 
on direct examination Sharrot stated that Pugsley on three 
occasions stated he would answer the complaints. (Tr., p. 
103). No testimony was given as to how much money would have 
been borrowed or as to the source of such funds. 
On cross-examination Sharrot stated that Mr. Janis induced 
him to form the Pacific States Investment Corporation and that 
he became president shortly after its formation. (Tr., pp. 
104-105). Sharrot admitted that at the time the original trans-
action took place it appeared that $4,900 was in default and 
for this reason he concurred with Mr. Janis that Pappalardo 
should execute a $4,900 note to Pacific. (Tr., p. 105). 
Sharrot recounted that at least one default notice had been 
served upon Pacific before the December, 1971 stipulation had 
been agreed upon. (Tr., p. 108). He admitted that a number 
of the properties were delinquent at the time of the stipulation. 
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(Tr., p. 109). He could not recall how much money was being 
asked for in the various foreclosure suits or whether attor-
ney^ fees were being sought, (Tr., p. 109). He could not 
remember whether the entire unpaid balances were being de-
manded. (Tr., p. 110). He could not recall whether Harry 
Pugsley had informed him that Cayias would defend some of the 
suits in that Pacific was also a named defendant. (Tr., p. 
111). At this point, the plaintiffs rested. (Tr., p. 112). 
Defense counsel moved to dismiss for failure to prove 
a violation of a legal standard of duty and for failure to 
show any proximate cause of injury. (Tr., pp. 114-119). The 
court granted the motion as to defendant Phil Pugsley, find-
ing no evidence sufficient to maintain a claim. (Tr., p. 
119). With serious reservations and over the objection of 
defense counsel, the trial court allowed plaintiffs to reopen 
their case in order to allow defendant Harry Pugsley to be 
examined. (Tr., p. 124). 
Upon direct examination by plaintiffs, defendant Harry 
Pugsley stated that he had been an attorney-at-law since 1936 
and that he was acquainted with the standard of practice with-
in the state of Utah. (Tr., pp. 125-126). He stated that if 
a client should come to him with a summons and complaint con-
cerning property that he would immediately inquire whether 
the alleged back payments were due and if so he would advise 
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the client to pay the obligation. (Tr., p. 126). 
Harry Pugsley further testified that he would not file 
an answer that was not based upon valid facts and that in 
this case Pappalardo had no funds, was on relief, and had 
never informed Pugsley that he could raise the funds to make 
the payments. For this reason he did not file an answer al-
leging that payments had been made. (Tr., p. 128). 
Pugsley testified that he ultimately did file answers in 
two cases and referred the others to Mr. Cayias since Pacific 
was obligated to make the payments to the legal owners of the 
properties. (Tr., p. 130). He further advised the Pappalardos 
to inquire from Security Title Company as to the status of each 
property since it was arranged that it would be the trustee 
under the deed of trust and would know the amounts owing. 
(Tr., p. 131). 
No pleadings were ever filed as to the two properties 
recovered since it could not be legitimately plead that no 
money was then owing. (Tr., p. 131). Pugsley testified that 
he received a letter from Cayias verifying the defense of one 
suit and an oral assurance that he would defend another. 
(Tr., p. 132). 
At the conclusion of Pugsleyfs testimony plaintiffs 
again rested and defendant Harry Pugsley renewed his motion 
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for dismissal. (Tr., pp. 133-137). After extensive arguments 
the trial court granted a motion for directed verdict as to 
both Philip Pugsley and Harry Pugsley on the grounds that no 
expert testimony was offered by plaintiffs to show the rea-. 
sonable duty of the defendants and that plaintiffs had failed 
to show that any alleged negligence of defendants was the 
proximate cause of any alleged property loss. (Tr., pp. 
137-138) . 
This judgment was reduced to writing and signed by the 
trial court on June 10, 1976. (R., pp. 51-52). Plaintiff's 
appeal is taken from this judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DIRECTED JUDGMENT IN FA-
VOR OF DEFENDANT HARRY PUGSLEY. 
At the conclusion of plaintiff's reopened case the trial 
court ordered a direction of the verdict in favor of defendant 
Harry Pugsley. The court stated: 
The Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff has 
failed to bear the burden of proof here as to a 
reasonable duty of the defendant, Harry Pugsley, 
and has offered no expert testimony to support what 
the duty was; and further, that the plaintiff has 
failed to bear the burden of proof as to proximate 
cause in this matter and for those reasons the Court 
grants the motion also for a directed verdict to 
Mr. Harry Pugsley. (Tr., pp. 137-138). 
The trial court was correct in its ruling in light of the stan-
dard to be applied in legal malpractice cases and in light of 
the standard to be applied in directing a verdict. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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It is well established that the elements of a legal 
malpractice action are the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship, the existence of a duty on the part of a law-
yer, a failure to perform this duty, and a showing that the 
negligence of the lawyer was a proximate cause of damage to 
the client. Hansen v. Wightman, 538 P.2d 1238 (App. Wash. 
1975); Weiner v. Moreno, 271 So.2d 217 (Ct. App. Fla. 1973). 
It is also well settled that the client bears the burden of 
pleading and proving each and every fact essential to esta-
blish these elements of his case. Harding v. Bell, 508 P.2d 
216 (Ore. 1973). 
Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to plaintiffs as is required in a motion for directed verdict, 
Boskovich v. Utah Construction Co., 123 U. 387, 259 P.2d 885 
(1953); Finlayson v. Brady, 121 U. 204, 240 P.2d 491 (1951), 
there is no doubt that plaintiffs failed to prove the essential 
elements of a legal malpractice case and therefore were pre-
cluded from jury consideration. 
A. The Trial Court Was Correct In Directing A 
Verdict Based Upon The Ground That Plain-
tiff Had Failed To Show That Any Alleged 
Damages Were Proximately Caused From The Ac-
tion Or Inaction Of Harry Pugsley. 
The element of proximate cause is, of course, a 
necessity in any action based upon negligence. In a legal 
malpractice case, however, a further step must be taken: i.e., Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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not only that the original suit was lost because of the at-
torney fs negligence but also that a different result would 
have occurred but for that negligence. The Supreme Court of 
Oregon in Harding v. Bell, 508 P.2d 216 (1973) quoted with 
approval the following authority: 
It is in connection with negligence in the conduct 
of litigation that the question of causation has 
presented its most difficult problem. Here the 
rule has developed that when the client lost his 
case he must show not only that the attorney was 
negligent but also that the result would have 
been different except for the negligence. In 
other words, this involves a "suit within a suit" 
and the client must show that he would have won 
the first suit as one step in order to win the 
second one. 
If the original action was lost, the client 
must show that the original claim was a sound one 
and that he was entitled to recover on it. If the 
defense was negligently not presented in the ori-
ginal action, the client must show that it was a 
valid one. 508 P.2d 216 quoting Wade, "The Attor-
ney's Liability for Negligence", Professional Negli-
gence (Roady and Andersen Bd. 1960) at 231-32. 
See also Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 5, 19-22 (1956); Leavitt, "The 
Attorney As Defendant", 13 Hast.L.J. 129 (1961) and Coggin, 
"Attorney Negligence. . .A Suit Within A Suit", 60 W.Va.L.Rev. 
225, 235-36 (1958). 
In the instant case plaintiffs failed in three different 
areas in proving that their alleged damage was a proximate 
result of defendant's actions even assuming a legal breach 
had occurred. These areas are as follows: (1) Plaintiffs 
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failed to show what events occurred as to each individual pro-
perty which caused its alleged loss; (2) Plaintiffs failed to 
produce sufficient evidence to establish that the real estate 
contracts could have been reinstated or that an action for 
foreclosure could have been won regardless of defendant's 
alleged negligence; (3) Plaintiffs failed to show that they 
sustained any damage even assuming the property was lost. 
(1) Plaintiffs Failed To Show The Dis-
position Of Each Piece Of Property. 
The plaintiffs in their complaint alleged that 
because of the actions of defendant they were "foreclosed of 
their equities in the properties". (R., p. 5). However, ex-
cept for this statement there is no evidence in the record as 
to what actually happened to each of the four properties which 
were "lost". In factf on direct examination Mr. Pappalardo 
admitted that after receiving the summonses or notices of de-
fault that he did not know what happened in the lawsuits or 
what happened to the property. All he knew was that he did not 
have the property any longer. (R., pp. 92-93). 
There was no showing by plaintiffs that the pro-
perties were lost by default or even foreclosed through judi-
cial action. This is illustrated by the following colloquy 
between plaintiff's attorney and the trial court: 
MR. DUNCAN: The part of the burden of proof 
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was that he brought the summons to him and Mr. Pugs-
ley didn't answer him. 
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Duncan, no evidence of 
that. 
MR. DUNCAN: There is evidence he lost all the 
property. 
THE COURT: Yes, but no evidence that he didn't 
do what he was asked to do and maybe he did answer 
them we don't know that. I don't know, the jury doesn't 
know, it isn't in evidence. We don't know what he did. 
MR. DUNCAN: He didn't, Mr. Pappalardo doesn't 
know what the complaints were. He turned them all over 
to Mr. Pugsley. 
THE COURT: Well, [that] is a matter of record. . . 
wherever they were filed and [would] be easy enough 
to ascertain if you wanted to find out what happened 
to these cases. (Tr., p. 123). 
Thus, if plaintiffs are to allege damages re-
sulting from the negligent actions of defendant in represent-
ing them in foreclosure actions, it is imperative that the 
plaintiff show the consequences of the original foreclosure 
actions. How can Pugsley be charged with fault when plaintiffs 
fail to even show what events transpired concerning the pro-
perty for which damages are claimed? As far as the record now 
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stands, it is just as likely that the properties are still 
controlled by Pacific Investment Corporation or just as likely 
that Pacific voluntarily gave the property back to the ori-
ginal owners. 
For this reason alone, the failure to esta-
blish the fate of each individual property precludes any re-
covery based upon negligent representation. 
(2) Plaintiffs Failed To Show That The 
Contracts Could Have Been Reinstated 
Or That They Would Have Prevailed In 
Any Foreclosure Action. 
Even if it were assumed arguendo that defen-
dant was negligent and that plaintiffs actually suffered a 
loss, plaintiffs still failed to meet their burden of showing 
that such negligence was the proximate cause of such loss. 
The evidence was uncontradicted that almost im-
mediately after having retained defendant, notices of default 
were served upon Pappalardo. (Tr., pp. 64-65, 108). The sti-
pulation entered into between the parties acknowledges a de-
linquency of past accounts and states that it would take Paci-
fic at least six months to bring the contracts current. (Ex-
hibit 1 ) . At the time of the stipulation in December of 1971 
a suit had already been commenced on one of the properties. 
(Tr., p. 109). Thus, the record shows a history of delinquent 
payments long before defendant was charged with failing to an-
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swer the foreclosure complaints. 
Throughout the trial and in plaintifff s brief 
it is alleged that they could have borrowed sufficient money 
to pay off the obligation had it not been for defendant's 
advice that such payment was unnecessary. 
This argument is without merit for two reasons: 
(1) since plaintiffs did not know how much was due and owing 
under the contracts it was impossible for them to represent 
that they had sufficient funds available; (2) plaintiffs pre-
sented no competent evidence that funds were available for them 
to borrow in order to meet the unknown obligation. 
As to the first reason, Pappalardo did not know 
what amount was owing at the time the suits were commenced, 
whether attorney's fees were being sought, or whether the en-
tire balances were declared due under the real estate contract 
provisions. (Tr., p. 90). Likewise Paul Sharrot did not know 
the answer to these questions. (Tr., p. 109). No testimony 
was offered by any of the property owners concerning the bal-
ances owing or whether the entire unpaid balances were required 
for reinstatement. 
As to the second deficiency, Pappalardo testi-
fied that he was unable to borrow on the properties because 
of insufficient equities and that it would have been necessary 
_1 Q_ 
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for his son-in-law to combine with him to obtain the money. 
(Tr., p. 89). He also testified that at that time he was in 
dire financial straits and was even on state welfare. (Tr., 
p. 91). There was no competent evidence whatsoever as to 
how much money plaintiffs could have borrowed or when such 
money would have been available. 
In Creative Inception, Inc. v. Andrews, 377 
N.Y.Supp.2d 1 (App. Div. N.Y. 1975) the appellate division 
of the Supreme Court of New York reversed a verdict against 
an attorney in which the plaintiff alleged that the attorney's 
negligence resulted in a forfeiture of the plaintiff's liquor 
license. In rejecting plaintiff's claim for damages the court 
stated: 
No records of any kind were introduced into evidence 
to substantiate the figures testified to by Mr. Nixon, 
plaintiff's president. The sole evidence on damages 
on this record consists of unacceptable unsupported 
testimony, without the production of a single book, 
bill, financial statement or any other paper." Id. 
at 3. 
Likewise, there is no supportive testimony or documentation 
that plaintiffs could have borrowed any amount of money from 
any institution. Plaintiff's mere assertion that the money 
was available is insufficient. See also Fischer v. xTohnson, 
525 P.2d 45 (Utah 1974) (No evidence that plaintiff had avail-
able money in which to close real estate transaction). 
The requirement that plaintiff must show his 
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capacity to borrow money is analogous to the requirement that 
a plaintiff must show the financial solvency of a defendant 
whom a claim could have been asserted against but for the al-
leged negligence of the attorney. 
In McDow V. Dixon, 226 S.E.2d 145 CCt. App. 
Ga. 1976) an action was brought against an attorney for fail-
ing to file a claim within the statute of limitations. A 
judgment was rendered against the attorney and he appealed. 
The Court of Appeals held that since the plain-
tiff had not shown the financial capacity of the defendant it 
could not be assumed that the defendant would have been able 
to pay to plaintiff the same amount as the judgment rendered 
against the attorney. The record in that case was void of any 
business records or financial statements showing the solvency 
of the defendant. Accordingly, the judgment was reduced to 
that amount which an insurance company representing defendant 
had originally offered to pay to the plaintiff before the sta-
tute of limitations had run. 
Similarly, plaintiffs in their case failed to 
show the amount required to satisfy the delinquent obligation 
(the only way to avoid a forfeiture) and further failed to show 
that such amount would have been available to plaintiffs for 
payment. Absent a showing that this amount could have been 
satisfied or absent a showing of some other valid defense, 
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plaintiffs1 interest could not have been jeopardized regard-
less of any negligence defendant Harry Pugsley may have 
committed. It was immaterial whether Pugsley answered the 
complaint, went to trial, appealed or did anything else if 
ultimately plaintiffs would lose the property because of in-
sufficient funds. 
This principle of showing a likelihood of 
success in the original action is supported by this court's 
decision in Young v. Bridwell, 437 P.2d 686 (Utah 1968). In 
that case an attorney was sued for failure to advise the plain-
tiffs to take an appeal in a case in which an adverse judgment 
had been returned against them. The lower court in the mal-
practice action determined that the appeal would not have re-
sulted in a reversal. This court affirmed the trial court 
and stated that before a cause of action existed "it would 
have to be shown that there was at least a reasonable likeli-
hood of reversing the judgment and that it would have bene-
fited the plaintiff." Id. at 689. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have carefully 
scrutinized the element of proximate cause in legal malprac-
tice cases and in many instances this factor alone has deter-
mined the outcome of the case. In Coon v. Ginsbergf 509 P.2d 
1293 (Ct. App. Colo. 1973) the appellate court reversed a 
verdict in favor of plaintiffs, holding that plaintiffs had 
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failed to show proximate causation. In Coon the defendant-
attorney had represented plaintiffs in an attempt to set 
aside a judgment previously entered against them. At the 
same time the attorney filed a counterclaim in the original 
action. Before these motions were heard, however, the at-
torney entered into a stipulation for a new judgment which 
replaced the former judgment. The plaintiffs claimed that 
this stipulation was unauthorized and the jury awarded plain-
tiffs $17,3 00 against the attorney. The appellate court in 
reversing held that there was no evidence showing that had 
the motion been prosecuted the judgment against the plaintiffs 
would have been set aside, that the trial on the merits would 
have resulted in a successful conclusion of the counterclaim, 
or that the amount of the judgment obtained would have been 
more favorable than the stipulated judgment. 
Likewise, in Weiner v. Moreno, 271 So.2d 217 
(App. Fla. 1973) the court reversed and remanded for a new 
trial an action of malpractice against an attorney who had 
failed to file a claim within the statute of limitations. In 
that case a decedent was involved in an automobile accident 
and taken to a hospital where alleged medical malpractice took 
place. The defendant-attorney failed to file a timely claim 
against the doctor and a judgment was awarded in the amount of 
$75,000 against the attorney. The appellate court reversed, 
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holding that the trial court erred in precluding evidence 
i 
that the death resulted not from medical malpractice but from 
the automobile accident and that the attorney's failure to 
prosecute the doctor would have been immaterial. f 
Finally, in Harding V. Bell, 508 P.2d 216 (Ore. 
1973) the Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed the trial court's 
1 
order of dismissal of a malpractice case based upon failure 
of plaintiffs to show proximate causation. In that case the 
plaintiffs claimed that the defendant attorney failed to plead j 
the defense of accord and satisfaction in a mortgage fore-
closure action and consequently lost the property. The Oregon 
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to show suf- ^ 
ficient evidence of accord and satisfaction and therefore its 
exclusion from the defense in the original action was not a 
( 
proximate cause of any loss. 
These cases and their accompanying authorities 
amply support the trial court's conclusion that plaintiffs < 
failed to produce any evidence that they could have reinstated 
the contracts or prevailed in a foreclosure action regardless 
of any negligence defendant may have committed. 
(3) Plaintiffs Failed To Show They Sus-
tained Any Damage Even Assuming The 
Houses Were Lost. 
Plaintiffs maintained throughout the trial that 
the four properties had been lost and that they therefore suf-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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fered damages in excess of $15,000. However, the plaintiffs 
failed to show that Pacific States Investment Incorporated 
was incapable of making its normal payments as provided in 
the $30,000 promissory note executed in the original stipula-
tion. Pursuant to that stipulation, the corporation was to 
pay plaintiffs $600 a month at 8 per cent interest and was 
to give a deed of trust only as security for the payment of 
this debt. 
It is elementary that plaintiffs could still 
proceed against Pacific States Investment Corporation under 
the promissory note regardless of the disposition of the pro-
perties. Only if the corporation were incapable of making 
such payments could it be said that plaintiffs have suffered 
any detriment. There was no evidence presented in plaintiffs1 
case showing the financial status of this corporation or why 
the promissory note could not be executed upon. 
The failure to prove this element of the case 
also precludes any finding of proximate causation resulting 
from defendant's alleged misconduct. 
Thus, the plaintiffs completely failed in all 
respects to show that any damages incurred were factually or 
proximately caused by the alleged negligence of Harry Pugsley. 
B. The Trial Court Was Correct In Directing A 
Verdict Based Upon The Ground That Plain-
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tiffs Had Failed To Produce" Expert Testi-
mony To Prove Harry Pugsley Had Breached 
A Duty To Plaintiffs, 
Plaintiffs in their brief attempt to characterize 
this case as a simple matter of failing to answer a complaint. 
Reading appellants1 brief it would appear that the following 
facts took place: (1) that Pappalardo received several sum-
monses and complaints; (2) that he promptly took them to 
Harry Pugsley; (3) that. Pugsley assured him he would answer 
the complaints and protect their interest; (4) that Pugsley 
did not answer the complaints; (5) that damages resulted from 
the failure of Pugsley to plead. (Appellant's brief, pp. 2, 
5, 9, 10). Were this characterization correct then plaintiffs1 
argument that expert testimony was not necessary may be entire-
ly plausible since it is likely a jury would have sufficient 
common knowledge to know that Harry Pugsley breached a duty. 
However, a review of the actual record and the evi-
dence presented clearly shows that the ideal situation as out-
lined by plaintiffs is not supported by the facts of this case. 
In truth, the record of plaintiffs1 evidence shows the follow-
ing: (1) plaintiffs ignorantly entered into a transaction 
whereby they gave up all their rights to their property to a 
corporation with no security that the corporation would ever 
make its obligations (Tr., p. 80); (2) that the corporation de-
faulted in its payments and the property owners began notifying 
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plaintiffs of the failure of payments (Tr. pp. 61, 64); (3) 
that plaintiffs consulted with defendant Harry Pugsley who 
told them he would attempt to rescind the original agreement 
and protect plaintiffs' interest in the property (Tr., p. 62); 
(4) that a lawsuit was instituted by Pugsley and consequently 
the corporation agreed to give to plaintiffs a security in-
terest in the property, to make all delinquent payments to 
the property owners within six months of the stipulation, and 
to immediately pay all current amounts owing (Ex. 1); (5) that 
upon receipt of the summonses and complaints Pugsley informed 
plaintiffs that the corporation under the stipulation was lia-
ble for the obligations to the property owners and that he 
would be in contact with its attorney to rectify the situa-
tion (Tr., pp. 68, 100); (6) that there was no defense to the 
allegations made by the property owners because the money they 
were seeking had not been paid (Tr., p. 108); (7) that several 
of the lawsuits were defended by attorneys representing the 
corporation and that Pugsley himself filed answers in two of 
them. (Tr., pp. 129-131). 
Thus, this is not a simple case of failure to file 
"responsive pleadings" as is alleged in plaintiffs' brief. 
Rather, it involves questions as to whether an attorney is ob-
ligated to defend a case where there is no valid defense, whe-
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ther he may rely upon a stipulation that another party shall 
pay all obligations within six months, and whether an attor-
ney has breached a duty by referring a defense to an attorney 
representing a joint obligor. These are not questions which 
may be answered from the common experience of a jury. 
This Court has addressed itself to the question 
of legal malpractice on only two occasions. In Young v. 
Bridwell, 20 U.2d 332, 437 P.2d 686 (1968) this Court af-
firmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of an attor-
ney charged with legal malpractice. As to the question of a 
professional duty this Court stated: 
Counsel is required to possess the ordinary legal 
knowledge and skill common to members of his pro-
fession. . . 437 P.2d at 690. 
In Nauman v. Harold; K. Beecher and Associates, 24 
U.2d 172, 467 P.2d 610 (1970) this Court reversed a judgment 
in favor of a plaintiff who was injured when the wall of an, 
excavation collapsed. This Court held there was insufficient 
evidence to show that the architect breached any duty or that 
the architect's conduct fell below the standard of care gener 
ally observed by architects in the locality. This Court then 
quoted a Michigan decision with approval which stated: 
[T]he responsibility of an architect does not 
differ from that of a lawyer or physician. When 
he possesses the requisite skill and knowledge, 
and in the exercise thereof has used his best 
judgment, he has done all the law requires. 
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After referring to Utah medical malpractice cases, this 
Court then stated: 
The liability of architects is based upon profes-
sional negligence with respect to which only those 
qualified in the field can testify as to the stan-
dard of competence and care possessed by profes-
sional men in the locality and whether there has 
been a breach of that standard of care, 467 P.2d 
at 615. 
Thus, this Court has held that the same high standards of 
proof are required to show a breach of duty in a legal mal-
practice action as is required in a medical malpractice suit 
or in any other action where a professional breach of duty 
is claimed. 
The Baxter v. Snow, 2 P.2d 257 (Utah 1931) and 
Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 67 P.2d 654 (Utah 1937) cases cited 
by appellants are not inconsistent with this standard. In 
both these medical malpractice cases this Court held that mere 
conjecture or suspicion respecting lack of skill or care is 
not sufficient evidence to allow a malpractice case to be sub-
mitted to a jury. As stated in Walkenhorst; 
The negligence of a defendant in a malpractice case 
must be shown affirmatively. It is not sufficient 
that there is a possibility of negligence. 67 P.2d 
at 667. 
These cases also establish that mere failure to obtain a re-
sult does not raise a presumption of want of proper care, skill, 
and diligence in malpractice actions. 67 P.2d at 667; Dorf 
. O Q _ 
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v. Relies, 355 F.2d 488, ,493 C6tii Cir. 1966). An attorney 
is presumed to have discharged the duty of his representa-
tion until the opposite has been made to appear. Mazer v. 
Security Insurance Group, 368 F.Supp. 418 CD. Penn* 1973) . 
Were this the case the plaintiffs characterize it 
to be, i.e., that plaintiffs had retained defendant to answer 
complaints, had valid defenses to each of them but defendant 
neglected to plead, then it would have been incumbent upon 
the trial court to rule as a matter of law that defendant 
had breached his duty to plaintiff. 
This distinction is vividly brought out in the case 
cited by appellants, Central Cab Company v. Clarke, 270 A.2d 
662 (Md. 1970). In Clarke a company had retained an attorney 
to defend it in a personal injury action but the attorney de-
cided not to proceed further with the case because of unsatis-
factory financial arrangements. The attorney, however, failed 
to notify the company that he declined representation and in 
the interim a judgment was taken against it by the plaintiff's 
attorney. The court stated the following concerning the fac-
tual distinctions to be made in determining whether expert 
testimony is necessary: 
There may well be cases where expert testimony is 
required in regard to whether the conduct of the 
attorney violates the standard of reasonable care 
or diligence in the particular situation. . . . 
The situation in the instant case is analogous to 
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cases involving medical malpractice in which a 
dentist pulled the wrong tooth, and our prede-
cessors held in affirming a judgment for the 
plaintiff that there was no necessity for expert 
testimony to establish that a dentist should not 
pull the wrong tooth, . . . The same rule applies 
in cases in which physicians have done an obvious-
ly negligent act such as accidentally amputating 
the wrong arm, or negligently leaving a sponge 
in a patient's body. Id., at 667. 
See also Herman" v» Rubin, 227 S.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct. App. Ga. 
1976); Moser v. Western Harness Racing Association, 89 Cal. 
App.2d 1, 200 P.2d 7 (1949) (held as a matter of law that a 
legal duty had been breached in failing to apply elementary 
principles of corporate law involving pre-incorporation sub-
scription agreements); Baxter v. Snow, 2 P.2d 257, 266 (Utah). 
Plaintiffs failed to show that Harry Pugsley did not 
in fact answer the complaints or that the attorney he re-
ferred them to did not in fact answer the complaints. It 
cannot be said as a matter of law that Pugsley violated his 
standard of duty to plaintiffs in either tendering the de-
fense of these cases to a joint obligor (where a stipulation 
had been entered into that the obligor was to have six months 
to bring the delinquent accounts current) or in failing to 
answer a complaint where his client had no valid defense. 
In this instance it was incumbent upon plaintiffs 
to produce an expert witness who could testify as to the lo-
cal custom and standard regarding stipulations, tendering of 
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example, was Pugsley obligated to comply with his clients' 
wishes to "delay" the foreclosure actions or would the filing 
of a pleading for delay be in violation of Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which states: 
The signature of an attorney constitutes a cer-
tificate by him that he has read the pleading; 
that to the best of his knowledge, information 
and belief there is good ground to support it, and 
that it is not interposed for delay. (Emphasis 
added). 
Obviously, this case falls in the category where expert opin-
ion is required. 
An analysis of cases in other jurisdictions also man-
dates this result. In Baker v. Seal,- 225 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa 1975), 
a case cited by appellant, the court held that the plaintiff 
failed to meet her burden of proof in failing to establish by 
expert testimony that a lawyer was negligent in proceeding under 
an amended dram shop statute rather than its predecessor even 
though the plaintiff claimed that the lawyer merely breached 
his duty in failing to file within the statute of limitations. 
In Brown v. Gitlin, 313 N«E.2d 180 (App.Ill. 1974) 
the Illinois court sustained a judgment entered in favor of an 
attorney on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to in-
troduce sufficient expert testimony showing that the attorney 
was negligent in failing to register the sale of stock between 
equal shareholders of a closed corporation. 
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The Court of Appeals of Georgia in Berman v; Rubin, 
227 S.E.2d 802 (App.Ct.Ga. 1976) sustained a lower court's 
granting of summary judgment in an action brought by a client 
against his attorney for allegedly failing to properly draft 
a settlement agreement. The court in holding that expert 
testimony was necessary to establish that the document had 
been improperly drawn stated: 
The reason for this requirement is simply that the 
jury cannot rationally apply a general statement 
of the standard of care unless it is aware of what 
the competent lawyer would have done under similar 
circumstances. Nor can the jury be permitted to 
speculate about what the "professional custom11 is* 
Competent evidence as to the "professional custom" 
in a given situation is required in malpractice ac-
tions against other professionals. . . Consistency 
demands a similar standard for attorneys. Id,, at 
806. 
The California Court of Appeals in Starr v. Mooslin, 
92 Cal.Rptr. 583, 14 Cal.App.3d 991 (Ct.App.Cal. 1971), cited 
by appellants in their brief, dealt with the alleged negligent 
giving of escrow instructions by an attorney. The court up-
held the judgment for the plaintiff xvho had produced expert 
witnesses to the effect that the defendant attorney had not 
exercised the degree of care ordinarily possessed by attorneys 
in good standing in that area. The court cited with approval 
previous California cases to the effect that without expert 
testimony a jury would have no way of knowing what was proper 
and would have no standard by which to judge the lawyer's ac-
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tions: 
Without expert testimony the confusion would be 
great indeed in some situations (such as in a mat-
ter involving trial tactics) because a jury would 
have no way of knowing what was proper and what 
was improper and would have no standard by which 
to compare the lawyer's actions. 92 Cal.Rptr. at 
588, 
The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in Dorf v. Relies, 
355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966) applied Illinois law to a case 
where a plaintiff sued his former attorney for alleged negli-
gence in the handling of the prosecution of a case. In order-
ing a directed verdict for defendant, the Circuit Court stated: 
It is the duty of an attorney to bring to the conduct 
of his client's business the ordinary legal know-
ledge and skill common to members of the legal pro-
fession, to act towards his client with the most 
scrupulous good faith and fidelity, and exercise in 
the course of his employment that reasonable care 
and diligence which is usually exercised by lawyers. 
In the instant case there was no testimony, ex-
pert or otherwise, by which a jury could determine 
that the conduct of Relies (the defendant) was not 
within the standard above set forth. It is not dis-
cernible how a jury, without evidence, could deter-
mine what constitutes ordinary legal knowledge and 
skill common to members of the legal profession. 
Without expert testimony, it was left to a jury of 
laymen to determine the reasonable care and diligence 
which lawyers usually exercise when confronted with 
the same or similar situations. Id. at 492. 
Numerous courts have referred to medical malpractice 
cases for guidance in the legal malpractice field. Guidance on 
this issue can be found in Utah as a result of a fairly sub-
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stantial body of decisions by this Court clearly indicating 
that Utah adheres to the rule that proof of negligent diag-
nosis or treatment in a medical malpractice case requires 
that expert testimony establish the ordinary care and skill 
required of a doctor in the community in which he serves. 
Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 U.2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 (1959); Ander-
son v. Nixon, 104 Utah 226, 139 P.2d 216 (1943). 
The plaintiffs1 claimed error in the rulings of 
the trial court concerning Pugsley's expert testimony is with-
out merit (Appellants1 brief, pp. 10-12). The question as-
sumed a fact not in evidence—that Pappalardo could raise the 
money. This question was improper as phrased. The court 
gave plaintiffs1 attorney ample opportunity to properly 
elicit information from defendant. (Tr., pp. 128-130). 
Plaintiffs1 claim of error as to Pugsley's testi-
mony of referral to Cayias is equally unjustified. (Appellants1 
brief, p. 11). The trial court did not strike any testimony 
concerning the referral of the lawsuits to Cayias. (Tr., pp. 
i 
129-^ 132) . The only reason the alleged conflict of testimony 
between Pugsley and Pappalardo was not "left to the jury" was 
simply that the trial court directed the verdict. 
Plaintiffs attempt to equate this case with one in 
which an attorney blatantly fails to answer a complaint on be-
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half of his client is simply unjustified. In this case the 
i 
record shows that defendant did in fact answer two of the 
four complaints given to him and referred the remaining law-
suits to Mr. Cayias, the corporation's attorney. (Tr., pp. | 
12 9-130). The question of the propriety of this referral, 
the obligation to file an answer when there is no valid de-
fense, and the requirement which the stipulation placed upon 
the parties are all questions which should have been explored 
through expert testimony establishing what other attorneys in 
the community would have done. 
The failure of plaintiff to produce such expert testi-
mony required the trial court to rule, as a matter of law, that < 
no breach of duty had been shown. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent Harry Pugsley would submit that the trial court 
correctly directed the verdict in light of the record before 
it at the conclusion of plaintiffs1 case. 
Plaintiffs failed to show what actually happened to the 
property, failed to show that the contracts could have been 
reinstated or that plaintiffs would prevail in a foreclosure 
action, and failed to show that they could not still recover 
on the promissory rote. Plaintiffs further failed to prove 
that defendant-respondent Harry Pugsley had breached his pro-
fessional duty to plaintiffs. 
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If the record now before this Court is sufficient to 
submit plaintiffs1 claim of malpractice to the jury, "the 
legal profession would be more hazardous than the law con-
templates." Dorf v. Relies, 355 F.2d 488, 494 (6th Cir. 1966) 
This is clearly not the case and, therefore, the judgment of 
the trial court must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
tfADSWORTH, & RUSSON 
Rex Hanson 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101' 
Attorneys for defendants-
respondent 
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